October 12, 2025

Dystopic Newsletter

Dystopic Golden Dome Space-Based Interceptors - the most critical system component

Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle Space-Based Interceptor (Raytheon)

Golden Dome: What We Have Learned So Far in Parts 1 and 2 of The Series

Before we begin our final installment of our Dystopic Newsletter series on the Golden Dome space-based missile defense, let’s review what we have covered so far in our first two Installments.

First of all, why did President Trump instruct the US DoD (now the Department of Defense) to take on the ambitious and technically challenging Golden Dome missile defense initiative?

• Expanded Threats: the proliferation of new extended-range cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles poses a threat to the US, our Allies, and armed forces deployed globally.
• Early Warning Systems Gaps: Our terrestrial (earth-based) early warning radars and current-generation space-based infrared detection satellites no longer provide adequate early warning for cruise and hypervelocity weapon threats. Golden Dome will be integrated with a new generation of space-based early warning and missile tracking satellites, enhancing and extending our terrestrial early warning systems
• Boost Phase Intercept Is Necessary: Terrestrial missile defenses are not enough. Boost phase intercept of the new and expanding array of threats is required. Integration of Golden Dome’s space-based interceptors as the “over layer,” to the existing upper(terrestrial theater systems), and lower (terminal defense systems) layers, will provide the US homeland, our allies, forward bases, and deployed Navy fleets a layered defense as deterrence against the onset of hostilities

In the first Dystopic Newsletter in the Golden Dome series, Space-Based Missile Defense: An Introduction to the Golden Dome Project, we focused on physics and technology to “size” a space-based system for missile defense. To summarise briefly:

• A space-based missile defense provides an “over-layer” of defense, allowing interceptors to target attacking missiles in their “boost phase” before they can deploy multiple warheads or countermeasures
• Advances in technology and a reduction in the cost to launch have made the concept feasible
• Due to the nature of orbital mechanics, the space-based interceptor constellation will provide a global defense. However, only a limited number of interceptors are in range to engage a specific attack. The limited availability of space-based missiles over a specific set of targets is referred to as the “absentee ratio.”
• Even for a basic defense, 4000 to 6000 space-based interceptors would be needed to intercept a massed attack of ~200 missiles from an enemy. Analysis by Todd Harrison at the American Enterprise Institute estimates that a robust defense against a full-scale nuclear attack by Russia and China would require between 75,000 and 85,000 space-based interceptors, costing several trillion dollars.
• Golden Dome, at least to start (as a basic defense), is intended to provide a limited defense capable of thwarting any attack from North Korea or a future nuclear-armed Iran, and degrading a first strike from Russia or China.

In the second Dystopic News Letter in the series, Red Alert – The New US Space-Based Early Warning System – PWSA, we focused on the expansion of the US early warning systems to new space-based capabilities for detection, tracking, and Battle Management, Command, Control, and Communications (BMC3). To summarize:

• The US Space Force and the Space Development Agency (SDA) are creating a new space-based communications tracking system: the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture - PWSA
• The PWSA is based on layers, including a communications Transport Layer, Tracking Layer, Battle Management Layer, and Custody Layer to provide a global resource for missile defense.
• The PWSA will be deployed in tranches of satellites and begin operations in 2026. It will reach full capacity of 500 satellites in the 2029-20230 time frame
• The PWSA is a part of a wider set of GEO and MEO early warning satellite system upgrades that the US DoD has in the works: the Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) system. OPIR includes new OPIR GEO and Polar (MEO) capabilities based on the new Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor Satellite (HBTSS)
• Between PWSA, OPIR, and terrestrial system upgrades, all the supporting systems for detection, tracking, and battle management will be in place and waiting for the first Golden Dome space-based interceptors when they are put in orbit

In this, the final Newsletter in our series on Golden Dome, we will delve into the space-based missile interceptor technology and operations, which are at the heart of the Golden Dome missile defense system.

To begin our discussion, let's examine the single largest issue facing space-based missile interception of an enemy missile: TIME. The limited decision window between detecting and classifying a missile launch as a threat and executing battle management commands, including handing off custody to a specific interceptor (whether space, sea, or land-based) to intercept the attacking missile.

Time: Greatest Challenge in Bost Phase Missile Defense

Dolden Dome is a layered defense system. While this series of Dystopic newsletters has focused on the new space-based missile segment, keep in mind that Golden Dome is a layered defense. A new space-based “over layer,” will be integrated with the existing “upper layer” midcourse /terrestrial theater systems and “lower layer” terminal defense systems that the US and our Allies already field. The following diagram illustrates the existing missile defense systems (green) and the proposed Golden Dome space-based interceptor system

A layered missile defense system provides multiple opportunities to engage a given target. Should any particular engagement along the attacking missile’s trajectory fail, the next layer can attend to engagement. Consider an ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) attack from North Korea on the Continental US (see diagram). The Layered defense would engage the attacking missile in the following order:

• Detection and Weapons Release: Space and terrestrial tracking assets determine that the attacking missile is a valid threat – tracking data is fed to selected engagement weapon systems, and the interceptor is released
• Boost Phase Intercept: Attacks from North Korea on either the US (ICBM attack) or Japan (MRBM attack) can be engaged by the Japanese and the US Aegis-equipped ships armed with SM3 Block IIB missiles. Only a space-based interceptor can be in position for boost phase intercept from ICBMs or hypervelocity glide vehicles from China, Russia, or a future nuclear Iran. Hence, the need for the Golden Dome system.
• Midcourse Intercept: After the boost phase is complete, the missile will release decoys and multiple warheads (MIRV), complicating the remainder of the intercept phases. The US GMD - Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System directly engages warheads in flight. Targting must discriminate live warheads for decoys that will likely be released
• Terminal Intercept: Depending on location, either ground-based THAAD or ship-based Aegis system will engage at a theater level as the final line of defense.

Ideally, ICBMs and hypersonic glide vehicles, which have a boost phase similar to an ICBM, should be engaged in the boost phase to negate decoy and MIRV (multiple warhead) deployment. It is also clear that a boost phase intercept requires proximity that only space-based interceptors can provide.

While boost phase intercept has the advantage of presenting a single target to intercept, it brings with it the issue of Boost Phase Intercept Short Fall. A successful intercept will make the weapon fall short of the target – the interceptor may not destroy the warhead(s). This means that live nuclear warheads could fall on populated areas short of the target.

Boost Phase Intercept Short Fall creates an added complication to the intercept problem. A specific “time to target” based on the target missile trajectory must be factored in to prevent collateral damage to other populated areas. As if this problem were not complicated enough!

The Decision Window Problem

As studies on space-based boost phase intercept performed by both the National Research Council and the American Physical Society point out:

For success, the intercept must occur before the attacking weapon achieves the velocity to reach the US. However, in the case of a typical attack from China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, weapons will likely fall in the unpopulated areas of Canada.

Sorry about that to our friends in the North! But look on the bright side, the same system will protect Canada’s big cities clustered near the US-Canada border. But I digress …

We aim to launch an interceptor as quickly as possible, ensuring the maximum time and range for the interceptor to destroy the target. This minimum time is defined as Zero Decision Time. Interceptors are fired as soon as tracking determines an attacking missile is a threat and has enough flight time to establish a firing solution. Zero Decision firing policy leaves zero margin or “battle space”.

The following diagram illustrates Zero Decision Time, an extended decision time (an additional 30 seconds), and the resulting time left to intercept for both solid and liquid propellant ICBMs

Here are the sobering numbers:

• Zero Time Decision: 45 seconds to interceptor launch and 120 seconds maximum intercept time
• Extend Time decision: 75 seconds to interceptor launch and 90 seconds maximum intercept time.

Time is indeed short! This begs the question: How can we make Zero Time Decisions with confidence? The answer is that we need to use a priori knowledge of the location of both strategic and tactical threat locations as part of the decision-making process. We need strategic reconnaissance information from our intelligence agencies …

The Role of Strategic Intelligence in the Decision Window

I could write a book on this subject, given that I spent most of my 20s working on strategic geolocation problems at the NSA, along with “other duties as assigned,” But I digress …

The US has a family of strategic intelligence agencies that continuously detail and map both strategic and tactical threats, specifically for early warning and for attack/counterattack in time of war. Complicating these efforts is that most threats today are mobile, not fixed, making strategic reconnaissance highly time-sensitive and rarely done perfectly.

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Here is a brief list of intelligence and defense agencies involved in performing “Strategic Reconnaissance” and targeting, along with links to their primary web pages (See Defense Primer: National and Defense Intelligence):

• ​National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Designs, builds, launches, and operates space-based reconnaissance systems, providing intelligence collection and products for national security and the military
• ​National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Provides geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), which includes analyzing and interpreting overhead data and imagery.
• ​National Security Agency (NSA) Specializes in signals intelligence (SIGINT), monitoring and processing global communications and data for intelligence and counterintelligence purposes.
• ​Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) An agency within the DoD that gathers and reports on military intelligence to support the armed forces and combatant commands

The work of these agencies is highly classified, but suffice to say, based on the location of the launch site of a missile, US reconnaissance can infer, with high confidence, that the missile is nuclear-armed or not. High-confidence launches can and should use “Zero Decision Time” in Boost phase intercept engagement. In alternate cases with limited a priori intelligence data, Battle Management systems can fall back to “Extended Decision Time” to further discriminate the target and perform weapon release (or not) based on additional data collection.

Given that we have 90 to 120 seconds for a space-based interceptor to engage and destroy a target in boost phase, what are the design properties for an interceptor?

With Time and Intelligence in mind, let’s turn our attention to the most critical component in the Golden Dome system - the interceptor.

Exoatmospheric Interceptors and Technological Limitations

Boost Phase intercept occurs between 130 and 170 seconds into an ICBM flight before the ICBM's solid-propellant booster burns out. While there are liquid-propellant ICBM boosters in the field today, they are being phased out. We will focus on thet more challenging solid-propellant booster engagement for this newsletter. During the boost phase, the target ICBM will be between 170 and 230 km altitude. (see diagram) The intercept occurs in outer space. There is no atmosphere, so the interceptor Kill Vehicle (KV) must be designed for exoatmospheric maneuvering using thrusters, not control surfaces like atmospheric (air-breathing) missiles.

The velocities between the Interceptor and the ICBM are so high (near 30,000 mph) that no explosive is needed. The kinetic energy of impact will destroy the ICBM. KKV Kinetic Kill Vehicles perform “hit to kill” interception and require no explosives. Which is great - no nasty explosive being put in orbit!

There are two major factors that impact interceptor design

• Flyout range: The range is based on interceptor velocities from 2km/sec to 6 Km/sec and mean accelerations of 6, 8, 10 g, based on physics and design limitations
• Orbit Altitude: flyout range can be maximized by selecting an orbit altitude close to the intercept altitude for an average engagement.

A target ICBM or Hypersonic booster will typically burn out at an altitude of about 200 Km, which is far too low to orbit and deploy a space-based interceptor permanently. LEO satellites experience atmospheric drag, which causes the orbit altitude to decrease. The sun has an 11-year solar cycle, which increases the atmospheric density as it heats the atmosphere and achieves a point of “Solar Maximum.” If we use the solar maximum atmospheric drag of a 200-kg/sq m satellite drag area, the interceptor satellite lifetime without a propulsion system would be:

• LEO 500Km – 3 Year orbital lifespan (Low Earth Orbit)
• LEO 400Km – 9 month orbital lifespan
• VLEO 300Km -50 day orbital lifespan (Very Low Earth Orbit)
• VLEO 200Km - 1 to 2 day orbital lifespan

Ideally, we would like a 200Km orbit for our interceptor; however, this is unrealistic. Simulations by the American Physical Society (APS) show that the satellite station-keeping thruster fuel budget to maintain orbit is excessive. Those same simulations by APS show that a VLEO 300 km orbit can be maintained for 5 years using one milli-newton ion station keeping thrusters with 50 Kg of ion fuel budget, which is a realistic and achievable requirement.

Advantages of using a VLEO 300 km orbit

• No Space debris – satellites will naturally fall out of the atmosphere in 50 days when thet thruster fuel has been expended. While we could just let the interceptor burn up in the atmosphere, each satellite at end-of-life provides an opportunity to perform an operational test. We can run an interceptor test as part of the disposal process.
• Range is maximized - little of the flyout distance is wasted on flying down to make the intercept if 400 or 500 km were used for the orbit height.

APS (American Physical Society) ran an extensive study and simulations of space-based missile design in the early 2000s for the technology they expected by 2010

At the time, an optimized solution balancing performance, range, and weight to orbit resulted in an interceptor driven by a two-stage solid propellant design, coming in at 820 Kg, capable of 10g acceleration and an average flyout velocity of 4 km/s. The intercept would include a 136 kg Kill vehicle capable of 2.5 Km/s and 15g acceleration in the end game.

APS estimated the Kill Vehicle weight could be significantly reduced in the 2025 time frame

• Sensors and avionics by 50% reduction (note: Moore's Law has seen to that)
• Diverter Motor Mass by 50% using materials and pumps
• Drop Tank Mass by 20% of propellant to 10%

As the Kill Vehicle mass decreases, the interceptors' acceleration stage(s) also decrease, allowing for a simplified single-stage design. A 2-stage intercept boost is not required today.

The end result is a 52Kg KV with a total interceptor mass of 314 Kg. This a 62% reduction in launch mass in 2025 vs the technology of the 2010 time frame.

In the 2000 to 2020 time frame, building a brilliant pebbles space-based defense was simply too expensive. In 2025, advances across all aspects of spacecraft technology, spacecraft weight, and launch costs make Dolden Dome a realistic program.

So what would the interceptor design look like?

There are three possible configurations of the kill vehicles that have been tested over the last 4 decades:

• Single Axial Thruster – Typical of air-to-air missiles using a “Sine Alpha” steering
• Spinning Kill Vehicle – used in 1970s and 1980s antisatellite weapons and the current US Navy Rolling Airframe (RAM) missile defense system. Steering is achieved by firing small pulse motors as the missile spins to make direct adjustments and close in on the target.
• Cruciform Configuration – the KV is boosted to the intercept velocity to the target and closes using a set of 4 divert thrusters and small thrusters mounted opposite the KV sensors provide pitch, yaw, and roll attitude control as shown in the following diagram

With years of testing in GMD, SM 3 Block IIA/B, and THAAD exoatmospheric intercepts, Golden Dome will most likely use a Cruciform Configuration KV configuration. Cruciform Configuration has the advantage of minimizing the size and weight of the KV to allow for high g-force thrust to close on the target during the endgame.

An open issue in interceptor design/requirement: should thet interceptor be hardened for atmospheric intercept? This is unlikely, at least in the early stages of the program. The additional mass from the heat shield and atmospheric control surfaces would compromise the flyout distance in exoatmospheric operations. This is why we have a layered defense; sea/land-based theater or terminal phase systems are optimized for this role in an overall Golden Dome missile defense system, at least for the near future.

It takes more than the interceptor to maintain and operate over a 5-year lifecycle in a VLEO 300Km orbit. Let's complete our overview of the Golden Dome space interceptor by addressing a few practical aspects of design and deployment.

Reality Check - Operation Systems, Sensors, and the End Game

At the start of the SDI Brilliant Pebbles space interceptor program in the 1990s, it was understood that a platform and housing would be needed to protect and maintain power and communications for the interceptors. To achieve the minimum mass, the support platform would be jettisoned when the interceptor was released, allowing the interceptor to have an absolute minimum mass and thereby maximizing its flyout range. A team at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL) came up with the concept of a “Life Jacket” to house the interceptor, as shown in the accompanying diagram.

A life jacket is a form of a garage for the interceptor. The life jacket ensures the interceptor has the lowest possible mass for acceleration to the target. The life jacket would contain:

• Solar power array panel, batteries, and the spacecraft power bus
• Horizon/Star tracker for attitude control sense
• Momentum wheels for attitude control
• Ion Thrusters and thruster fuel for station keeping and space debris collision avoidance – in 2024, the average SpaceX Starlink satellite made 35 collision avoidance maneuvers – it's getting crowded up there.
• Optical Communications Terminal (compatible with PWSA)
• Possible proximity LIDAR to maneuver against intentional collision (counter-space satellite warfare)
• Redundant Phased Array RF communications terminal
• Protective housing against natural space radiation, micro meteorites/space debris, earth or space-based directed energy weapons

There can be no doubt that Goden Dome will use the same life jacket concept when the space-massed interceptors are deployed.

Up to this point, we have not discussed the sensors and tracking that the KV will require to intercept the target. We can expect Golden Dome to leverage the state-of-the-art technology already employed in terrestrial missile interceptors, with minor modifications.

The KV will need two specific sensors to converge on a kill.

• Long Wavelength InfraRed (LWIR) imaging sensor to sense the target missile plume and the rocket body’s thermal emissions in the initial engagement
• LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) for short-range final tracking. LIDAR has the advantage of providing distance measurements to the KV Avionics/guidance suite for target closure

Using its LWIR and LIDAR sensors, upon weapons release, thet KV intercept experiences 3 distinct phases:

• Initial Divert Phase – The KV maneuvers are based on targeting data from external off-board sensors (for example, the Tracking Layer of PWSA)
• Homing Phase- begins when KV on-board Long Wavelength InfraRed (LWIR) sensor acquires the target, and off-board sensor data can be terminated. Alternatively, both on-board and off-board sensor data can be fused
• The End Game – as the LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) locks onto the target with an aim point set to the weapons package, not the target booster. In the last few seconds of terminal homing, maneuvering limits, time lag, and sensor accuracy determine thet final outcome – did KV hit or miss the target

If it is hit, we are done. If it is a failure, the target missile will deploy MIRV and decoys, and engagement (custody) will be turned over to the mid-course ground-based missile defense system.

Some final thoughts on the Dystopic Gold Dome series

WE CAN DO IT:

The US can successfully build Golden Dome space-based interceptors. We possess technology and launch cost economics to field the system successfully. The reconnaissance and early warning systems for battlefield management of Golden Dome will be operational next year.

Today, the US DoD is committed to a limited capability Golden Dome system that can completely thwart a maximum effort North Korean, future nuclear-armed Iranian, or unknown rogue actor attack. Between 2000 and 4000 interceptor satellites would be required. With a 5-year service life, roughly 800 replacement satellites would be launched every year to replace the 800 satellites at end-of-life that will be decommissioned to burn up in the atmosphere.

This limited Golden Dome system would not be capable of stopping a general First Strike from Russia or China. The strategic deterrence of MAD, Mutually Assured Destruction, would remain in place. A limited Golden Dome system could protect a handful of strategic military facilities and strategic cities like Washington, D.C., and San Diego (Navy Base). Countering a general first strike would require a system ten times larger, exceeding 40,000 satellites.

Global Protection Including Deployed Armed Forces:

As a practical matter, Golden Dome would not be limited to nuclear attack defense. In a conflict with China over Taiwan, China would attack our Pacific military bases in Japan, the Philippines, and Guam, along with US Navy Pacific carrier task forces with the DF-ZF, hypersonic glide vehicles carried on DF-17 MRBM (medium-range ballistic missiles). Golden Dome could be used to intercept MRBM weapons in the boost phase, thereby “thinning the herd” and enhancing US and Allied theater and terminal ground and sea-based missile defenses, which would improve the odds of eliminating the remaining threats.

For Every Defense There is an Offense:

Golden Dome is not impervious to attack. China and Russia are fielding ground and space-based weapons to neutralize US and Allied reconnaissance and communications satellites, and by extension, future Golden Dome interceptors satellites. These include:

• Ground-based Directed Energy Weapons (lasers) to blind our IR and Optical satellites and will, at some point, achieve power levels to disable spacecraft
• Space-based Directed Energy Weapons (lasers and RF) to disable spacecraft
• Space-based systems to grapple our satellites and effectively alter their orbits burn up in the atmosphere
• Ground-based anti-satellite missile systems - a targeted Golden Dome satellite (Life Jacket + interceptor) would likely engage such an attack with the net result of expending a Golden Dome Interceptor
• Upper Atmospheric Nuclear weapons release. An indiscriminate but highly effective method for eliminating a large number of LEO satellites. All satellites, regardless of country of origin, will be destroyed in the nuclear blast Kill Radius. You can read about Russian efforts to field nuclear space weapons in my blog: Nuclear Weapons in Space: High Altitude EMP (HEMP) and Alternative Threats, From Russia or Others h

The bottom line is that one way or another, the major nuclear powers have already turned space into a new theater of warfare.

The only way out of a spiraling arms race in both nuclear and space-based weapons would be to have urgent and earnest arms control negotiations. The US has vigorously pursued arms limitation with Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. None of these countries is willing to have talks. For Iran, the US and Israel were forced to destroy their nuclear weapons development. facilities in the 12-Day War. However, that was a stop gap, Iran promises to rebuild capability to enrich uranium.

We can only hope cooler heads prevail moving forward.

And In Other News …

Peace in Gaza - As the Wall Street Journal reports, President Trump’s unorthodox foreign policy maneuvers have accomplished what the Biden Administration and Foggy Bottom (i.e., the State Department) old-school diplomacy could not - results. Trump’s approach involves declaring victory first and then forcing others to fill in the details, thereby making a cease-fire agreement a reality.

Will it work out over the next few weeks or fall apart?

Similar negotiations with Vladimir Putin failed in the end

With respect to Iran, there have been no further negotiations on the elimination of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. Will the US and Israel need to bomb facilities again in the near future?

As a nation (the US) and for the world, we can only hope that President Trump’s radical, blunt, and unorthodox diplomatic and trade policies and negotiations come to positive conclusions … there is a great deal riding on them!

The US Navy turns 250

The US Navy celebrated its 250^th anniversary with a series of festivities despite a government shutdown that could affect military pay

On October 13^th, 1775, John Langdon of New Hampshire, Silas Deane of Connecticut, and John Adams of Massachusetts formed an advisory committee to take steps for the Colonies to protect American trade from British blockade and predation by arming commercial ships. The committee was essentially asking Congress to approve letters of marque and reprisal, which are government-issued licenses authorizing private citizens (privateers) to seize enemy assets during wartime to intercept British ships laden with supplies for the king’s forces. Within hours, the Congress approved the committee’s recommendation that Massachusetts supply General George Washington, then stationed in Massachusetts, with an armed schooner and a sloop for the purpose of seizing British supplies

It wasn’t until 1794, long after the War of Independence had been won, that Congress approved the Naval Armament Act on 27 March 1794. This act provided the funds to build the famed “ Six Frigats,” the foundation of a permanent US Navy. The frigates Congress, Constitution, President, United States, Constellation, and Chesapeake were soon launched. They would be captained by the US Navy’s first officers, whose commissions were approved by Congress: John Barry, Samuel Nicholson, Silas Talbot, Joshua Barney, Richard Dale, and Thomas Truxton. All of these officers were naval veterans of the American Revolution.

Read more about the founding of the US Navy at the US Navy Historical Website.

Japan has a new Prime Minister

As reported by the BBC, Sanae Takaichi was elected leader of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on its 70th anniversary. She will become Japan's first female Prime Minister

The 64-year-old conservative politician is often compared to the “Iron Lady,” Margaret Thatcher, the UK’s first female Prime Minister. Takaichi, a protégée of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, won with a pledge to restore Abenomics policies, boost national security, and implement stricter social and immigration controls.

As an Ally to the US, Takaichi supports:

• Revising Article 9 of Japan's pacifist constitution to formalize and expand the role of the Self-Defense Forces
• Accelerating the implementation of Japan's defense strategy and increase defense spending.
• Strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and reducing Japan's economic reliance on China. Takaichi is considered a “China Hawk”

North Korea Test Solid Rocket Motor for Hwasong-20 ICBM Specifically Designed to attack the US

According to Ajazieera, the Hwasong-20 ICBM was revealed for the first time at a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party.

As reported a month earlier, the Hwasong-20 ICBM program completed ground testing of its new solid fuel booster. According to the North’s official Korean Central News Agency, the carbon fiber-fabricated engine is capable of producing 1,971 kilonewtons of thrust, increasing Hwasong-20 range to hit any target in the US.

SO .. our assumption of analyzing Golden Dome interceptors using solid-propulsion is actually grounded in the prevailing facts in the field …

That’s a wrap for this week …

Dystopic- The Technology Behind Today's News

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