September 7, 2025

Dystopic Newsletter

Space-Based Missile Defense: An Introduction to the Golden Dome Project

Artist Concept of Golden Dome Space-Based Missile Defense (L3 Harris)

Until the last decade, the US stood as the sole superpower. At that time, China had fewer nuclear weapons than either the UK or France. North Korea had a limited nuclear arsenal and lacked an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the US. The New START Treaty limited the U.S. and Russia to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 800 deployed and non-deployed missile launchers. Finally, Iran, while still exporting terrorism, only had a limited supply of highly enriched uranium and was not close to making a nuclear weapon.

Finally, the US had no enemies in the “Western Hemisphere” (i.e., North and South America) and a massive buffer of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans forming the so-called “Fortress America.”

Those Days Are Over …

Over the last decade, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have formed an “Axis of Tyranny, seeking to challenge the current world order that has brought relative peace since the end of World War 2 nearly 80 years ago. Russia has invaded Ukraine, and war reigns in Europe once more. Iran fomented war in the Middle East, leading to the 12-Day War between Iran and Israel, and may still possess enough highly enriched uranium to make 10 nuclear weapons. Despite successful US and Israeli attacks, the enriched uranium remains unaccounted for. North Korea has successfully developed an ICBM capability capable of reaching cities across the US and has greatly expanded its nuclear weapons arsenal from 10 to 50 warheads. China has embarked on a massive expansion of its navy to threaten Taiwan, and its nuclear arsenal threatens the US and our Pacific Allies.

We have entered a New Cold War. The West remains unprepared without a coherent deterrence plan with our Allies. Our “unpreparedness” was the motivation for my new book:

How The Hell Did We Get Here? A Citizen’s Guide to the New Cold War and The Rebuilding of Deterrence.

Want a deeper understanding of how we got here and what we can do about it? READ THE BOOK - You can find it HERE

The US and our Allies must face up to the facts and rebuild our deterrence, including “Deterrence by Protection/Denial” by expanding our missile defenses.

Today, the US deploys layered missile defenses throughout Europe, the Middle East, and surrounding China in the “First Island Chain” of Taiwan, the Philippines, Guam, and Japan (see map). We have only limited missile defense of the homeland and the Western Hemisphere. The Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are no longer a viable buffer with Russia, China, and North Korea possessing nuclear-armed ICBMs and Hypersonic glide vehicles that can evade our traditional network of radar early warning stations (see diagram). Today, we have an imperfect shield.

You can learn more about U.S. terrestrial missile defense and early warning systems from my blog: Missile Defense: An Imperfect Shield. A brief excerpt from the book is used to describe missile flight paths and the systems used to intercept them later in this newsletter.

We have all seen and read about Israel’s layered missile defense systems, including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow, augmented by US THAAD and Patriot batteries and US Navy Aegis warships equipped with SM-3 interceptors. The results have been impressive.

This begs the question: if the US needs a missile defense equivalent to Israel's, why not just deploy an equivalent defense around the US?

The simple truth is that traditional earth-based missile defenses would be prohibitively expensive. Israel is a small country roughly the size of New Jersey, occupying roughly 8,500 square miles. The US occupies 3,809,525 square miles, and New Jersey is just 0.2% of the US landmass. You cannot scale up missile defense based solely on earth-based missile defenses; it is not economically feasible.

The US possesses a limited defense of 44 Interceptors deployed between Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Space Force Base, California. These interceptors, part of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GBMD) system, are designed to destroy incoming intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) warheads in space before they reach their target in the United States. GBDM was designed to protect against rogue missile attacks from a future nuclear-armed Iran. The GBMD system would provide limited protection against a Russian or Chinese general nuclear attack of 100s of nuclear weapons. (read more about the GBDM HERE)

With tension escalating around the world, our current missile defenses are inadequate and far too limited to be a deterrent to Russia or China. In fact, they were never meant to be a deterrent against a general nuclear attack. It is only MAD, Mutually Assured Destruction, the fear of complete annihilation, that holds nuclear power in check. So, what will the US, and by extension our Allies, do to significantly enhance our missile defenses, our “Deterrence by Protection/Denial?” \

Enter Golden Dome – A revamping of the 1980s Star Wars Missile Defense

On May 20, 2025, President Trump formalized the January 27, 2025, Executive Order (EO) 14186 to make a “historic investment in American security and fulfill our duty to protect the homeland first and foremost”. The President named this future defense system “Golden Dome.” A few months later, Congress secured $25 billion in funding for fiscal Year 2026 in the FY 2026 Budget, as part of the One Big Beautiful reconciliation bill. The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation estimates the deployed cost of Golden Dome will be over $500 billion

Golden Dome will feature a layered missile and air defense, with space-based missile defense providing the primary layer and secondary, earth-based missile defenses augmenting protection for high-value locations, such as military bases and select major cities, based on the current systems that the US deploys today. Early warning, Reconnaissance, and Command-Control by a combination of current ground-based early warning radars augmented by the new space-based Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA). PWSA is a resilient, layered network of hundreds of interconnected small satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO), developed by the U.S. Space Development Agency (SDA). Due to be completed by 2027, PWSA has the ability to track aircraft, ballistic cruise missiles, and most importantly, hard-to-detect hypersonic glide vehicles.

We will take a deep dive into the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA in our next Dystopic Newsletter.

The Golden Dome Concept is not new. It is over 40 years old
“On March 23, 1983 in a televised address to the nation, U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced his intention to embark upon groundbreaking research into a national defense system that could make nuclear weapons obsolete. The research took a number of forms which collectively were called the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI.

SDI was never deployed. However, it did serve as a very useful bargaining chip in nuclear arms negotiations at the time. Threat of a deployed SDI terrified thet USSR leadership. So much so that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev linked his demands that the United States drop SDI to the negotiations for the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) and the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START). A few years later, following the breakup of the former USSR, the end of the Cold War, and the establishment of the INF and START treaties, plans to deploy SDI/StarWars were scrapped, and research was highly curtailed.

The futuristic research funded by SDI did, however, generate foundational research in two critical areas:

• Brilliant Pebbles - small, lightweight spacecraft that could stop advanced ballistic missiles and their components in boost phase by colliding with them at high speeds. On command, a global constellation of these non-nuclear spacecraft could detect and destroy missiles without any external help (Learn More HERE)
• Nuclear Directed-Energy Weapons – Project Excalibur, a Lawrence Livermore program promoted by Edward Teller, the inventor of the hydrogen bomb, to research nuclear-pumped x-ray laser systems. While initial experiments produced the desired X-ray Laser effects, decades would be required to make a functioning weapons system. Instead research funds were directed into the solid state laser and Free-Electron Lasers (FELs), which are now entering deployment against massed drone attacks for Army, Navy, and Marine deployments.(Learn More HERE)

Everything Old is New Again

As it turns out, this research did not go to waste – SDI was ahead of its time. The concept far outstripped the technology and space ecosystem of the time. Here are a few examples of how the economics and technology have changed from 1980’s and 1990’s vs today:

Launch costs: Have been reduced from $54,500 per kilogram (Kg) placed into Low Earth Orbit (LEO) to $32 / (Kg) with the commercial launch of SpaceX STARSHIP, a 4200x reduction is costs compared to the 1980 Space Shuttle

Computing Power: In 1975, INTEL CEO Gordon Moore predicted that the number of transistors in a microchip would double every 2 years. His prediction, known as Moore’s Law, has been valid ever since. Computing power on a chip has increased by a factor of 1,000,000 while costs have fallen by the same factor.

Data Storage: The density and cost of data storage also follow Moore's Law. Today, storage is not based on magnetic disks of the 1980s. Storage today is done with massive arrays of solid-state memory chips

Communications: Powered by Moore's Law, advanced RF antenna arrays (which also power phased array radar) are efficient in providing satellite links to earth and direct laser communications between satellites. In 1980, the transfer of 1 Terabyte of data cost $1 billion; today, it costs less than $100. Cybersecurity of communications has undergone a parallel revolution along with communication speeds

Manufacturing: A majority of the parts that make up a spacecraft/satellite can be printed. Plastics, metals, and other composites (such as graphite/carbon fiber) can all be printed. These additive manufacturing techniques eliminate the waste associated with creating molds or using subtractive manufacturing with computer numerical control (CNC) tooling. Components can be printed today that could not be manufactured in thet 1980s and 1990s

Sensors and Other Components: improvements in material science, computing, and manufacturing have had a similar impact on everything from solar cells (which generally power spacecraft) to space-borne optical and radar sensors

AI: A massive worldwide defense system will require sophisticated Command and Control. Decisions will have to be made in seconds or fractions of a second. There will still be a degree of “human in the loop” control; however, a number of early warning and response functions will have to be controlled by “machine in the loop”. There is simply not enough time for a human reaction or decision in a number ( but not all) instances. Again, AI is possible due to the reduction of compute/storage costs and communications bandwidth

The point is that technology and manufacturing capabilities have reached a point where it is economically feasible to make Golden Dome (also known as space-based missile defense) work.

Over the next few Dystopic Newsletters, we’ll explore some of the critical technologies and systems that will enable a working Golden Dome system

For this newsletter, we are going to answer a fundamental question …

What is Gold Dome, and just how big and complex is it?

As previously noted, Golden Dome is a layered missile defense system concept that focuses on developing a space-based missile defense system to augment an expanded network of current U.S. Earth-based missile systems. But first, we need to understand a nuclear missile's launch and flight sequence to understand missile defense systems themselves. Here is an excerpt for How The Hell Did We Get Here:

Regardless of the missile range, intercontinental, intermediate, or short, its flight path is characterized by three stages.

• The Boost Phase: extends from the time a missile is launched from its platform until its engines stop thrusting. The unique thermal signature allows infrared satellite sensors to detect and track the missile. Loaded with propellant, the missile is most vulnerable to an attack in the boost phase. The U.S. and all other nations lack drone or other combat aircraft platforms capable of mounting a boost phase attack for most locations. The one exception is North Korea, where U.S. and Japanese Navy Aegis equipped destroyers armed with SM-3 interceptors can engage North Korean Ballistic missiles in the boost phase over the Sea of Japan.
• The Midcourse Phase: the longest of the three phases, it offers a unique opportunity to intercept an incoming threat. Space-based optical and radar satellites track incoming enemy missiles during the midcourse phase, feeding tracking and point-of-impact data to ground-based early warning radars and antimissile systems. Enemy decoys are more readily identified in the mid-course phase. The first layer of the U.S. missile defense, GBM, is a ground-based mid-course interceptor missile that engages the targets at this time.
• The Terminal Phase: Typically less than one minute long, enemy warheads achieve their highest velocity during the terminal phase, drastically shortening the window of engagement. The incoming warhead's rapidly reducing altitude limits the coverage area of our terminal phase air defense interceptors: THAAD- Theatre High Altitude Area Defense interceptor, Navy AEGIS SM-3, Patriot PAC-3, and Israel's Arrow 2 and 3 interceptors.

Terminal phase interceptor systems can engage "air-breathing threats" like drones, cruise missiles, and aircraft. Low-cost, short-range antimissile systems like the vaunted Israeli Iron Dome system augment these systems. The Iron Dome will shortly be joined by very short-range direct energy weapons, like the Rafael Aerospace Iron Beam system.

Different missile systems are designed to combat specific types of incoming missiles by the range of the missile, short, intermediate/medium, and intercontinental, as well as the phase of the attacking missile, midcourse, or terminal. The U.S. continually upgrades its interceptors and missile defense systems to engage a wider range of threats. For example, the latest upgrade to the U.S. Navy's SM3 missile, SM3 Block IIA, allows midcourse intercept of medium and Intermediate-range missiles. SM3 Block IIA is ideally suited for midcourse intercept of North Korean intermediate-range missiles fired at Japan. The U.S. has deep strategic antimissile development programs with Israel and Japan, in part due to the imminent threats both countries face from Iran and North Korea, for Israel and Japan, respectively.

Except for the GMD, Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, which relies on the U.S. global early warning detection network, missile defense systems like Patriot or Iron Dome are designed to be self-contained and easily deployed. A typical missile defense system contains three elements. First is a powerful phased array radar capable of tracking hundreds of targets simultaneously. Second is a targeting and control system operated by the defense system personnel who designate targets and select the interceptors to engage those targets. Finally, we have the interceptors themselves, which are deployed in launcher batteries, each containing from 4 to 20 interceptors, depending on the specific system. Typically, eight or more launcher batteries are deployed with each Radar and Control system.

Multiple systems can be tied together to share tracking and command functions and to allow a layered defense. For example, the critical island base of Guam in the Pacific will integrate a layered island defense based on THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) for long-range defense, Patriot for mid-layer defense, and Iron Dome systems as a short-range defense. In addition, very short-range, "point defense," C-RAM (Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar) Gatling gun systems as a final defense and to engage massive drone attacks should one be launched against the island.

To thwart US earth-based early warning systems and missile defense systems, Russia and China have developed long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles (low speed) and HGV – Hypervelocity Gluide vehicles (high speed in excess of Mach 5). Both of these systems fly under US Earth-based early warning radar systems. Early detection of these threats is only possible with space-based early warning systems, which is why the US Space Force is already busy building out its new Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) for space-based early warning and communications. The PWSA is a necessary precursor to building out space-based missile devices and will be the subject of our next Dystopic newsletter.

The Challenges of Missile Intercept

The greatest threat the US and our Allies face is from four types of nuclear-armed missiles:

• ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missile – direct global attacks on the US from our enemies ( e.g., Russia, China, and to a limited extent North Korea)
• IRBM -Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile- theater attacks in Europe from Russia or Iran, the Middle East from Iran to Israel, or a Western Pacific attack by China
• SRBM – Short Range Ballistic Missile - any place on the globe bordering China, Russia, North Korea, and possibly nuclear-armed IRAN
• HGV – Hypersonic Glide Vehicle – these systems have launch characteristics of a ballistic missile ( a boost phase) but then release the glide vehicle when hypersonic speeds are achieved.

The massive IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) attacks that Iran launched against Israel in the 12-Day War displayed the difficulty of the missile intercept problem: Defensive interceptors traveling at Mach 3 must engage IRBM warheads traveling at terminal velocities of at least Mach 12. As the following table points out, the current US and Israeli terminal phase intercept has to deal with three challenges:

• Velocity of the incoming nuclear warhead: Mach 5 to Mach 30, and for a major nuclear attack, most weapons are traveling at greater than Mach 25
• The short duration of the terminal phase engagement window: typically 1.5 minutes (90 seconds)
• MIRV Ballistic Missiles: ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) are configured with multiple warheads, so-called MIRV for Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles that deploy in the midcourse phase. ICMBs are configured with 3 to 12 warheads/reentry vehicles, which further multiplies the number of targets in terminal phase missile defense engagements.

Ideally, we would like to engage ICBM/IRBM and HGV missiles during their boost phase. Why?

• Detection: the boost phase is easily detected by the massive thermal plume of the launch vehicle booster
• Ease of Destruction: The tremendous forces on the launch vehicle during boost phase make it easier to destroy
• Stop MIRV deployment: MIRVs are deployed in the midcourse phase of the launch and multiply the number of targets in both the midcourse and terminal phases of engagement

The problem for boost phase engagement is proximity. Missile interceptors need to be close to the launch point to engage. In the case of North Korea, this is possible. Japan has a number of US Aegis-equipped destroyers deployed at all times in the Sea of Japan around North Korea, armed with the powerful SM-3 IIB interceptor. Israel was able to use F-35 Lightning stealth fighters to directly destroy Iranian IRBM launches and missiles in the Boost phase. Unfortunately, that proximity does not exist for major nuclear ICBM complexes and mobile nuclear launchers possessed by Russia and China.

There are drawbacks to space-based missile defense – expense and complexity. So let's dive into technical complexity.

Issues Impacting the System Design of Space–Based Interceptors

There are three basic issues that must be addressed to have a working space-based missile defense. The first is the intercept range problem.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the SDI program extensively explained the technical factors and difficulty of designing a system. Fundamentally, it comes down to three factors;

• The range and velocity of a practical interceptor
• The orbital parameters of the space-based interceptor - the interceptor platform closure toward the target missile both moving on the order of Mach 20
• Detection, Tracking, Communications, Command and Control (covered in our Next Dystopic when we examine the US Space Force’s PSWA satellite system)

For today’s Dystopic, we will focus on interceptor and orbital system design issues, which are highly interdependent. We will start by considering a single orbiting interceptor.

A space-based boost phase intercept occurs as early as feasible to characterize the launch as a legitimate threat. This places the intercept point in Low Earth Orbit, somewhere between 100 km and 600 km above Earth. The interceptor is already traveling in orbit and has a defined velocity and trajectory based on the orbit path and outlined in the following table.

The height of the intercept is determined by the altitude of the interceptor in orbit and the distance it can “fly out” in the time available to intercept the target. In VLEO (Very low earth orbit - less than 350 Km) or LEO, the interceptor is already traveling incredibly fast, at least Mach 21 ( ~27,000 km / h or 16,700 MPH). Firing the interceptor imparts a change in velocity, which creates a kill radius.

The following diagram illustrates a single intercept starting at the time of detection and the determination to intercept the detected missile for steps, T0 (time zero) to T3 (time three - poing of intercept) based on the American Physical Society paper, “Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept systems for National Missile Defense”

• T0 - the attacking launch is detected, and the intercept satellite is far out of range of the intended target but closing to intercept
• T1 – Intercept calculations have completed, and our intercept is fired. The blue sphere indicates the growing potential kill zone of the interceptor. The target (red flight path) continues to gain altitude
• T2 – The Kill zone continues to grow over time. The target missile continues to gain altitude.
• T3 – The kill zone and flyout range of the interceptor converge at a range for the satellite ‘R’ based on the flyout range (rflyout) and the height of the Intercept

​Calculations by CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) based on the American Physical Society paper and realistic technical capabilities of sapce based interceptor, the Maximum Kill Radius is 836 Km

Now that we have mastered the basic principles of a single missile intercept from lower earth orbit, how do we calculate the number of satellites needed for Golden Dome?

We will start with a crash course on orbital mechanics to understand how constellations of satellites, like Starlink, are created.

Orbital Mechanics – A Crash Course

In our previous discussion, we introduced a table that provided orbit duration, number of orbits, around the earth in one day, and the orbital velocity for a given satellite orbit height. We can design a constellation of satellites ( an organized set of satellites) to provide specific coverage of areas of the Earth.

A single satellite is placed into orbit at a given angle crossing the Earth’s equator, called the angle of inclination of the orbit, as shown in the following figures. Orbit inclinations range from 0, an equatorial orbit. to 90 degrees 9a polar orbit. The inclination angle is measured by the angle of the satellite path as it crosses the equator.

As a satellite orbits on its given inclination, it creates a ground track that shifts across the Earth. For LEO orbits, a single track is between 90 minutes and 2 hours, resulting in 12 to 16 tracks across the Earth in a 24-hour period. A satellite in an 85-degree inclination orbit and the associated 24-hour ground track are shown in the following diagrams.

We can launch more than one satellite into a single orbital inclination space evenly to increase our coverage rate by N, the number of satellites in a so-called orbital plane, which is usually shortened to “plane,”

We then launch additional satellite planes, offsetting their crossing point of the equator to create an even distribution of satellite coverage called a constellation.

There is one more wrinkle: we combine one or more constellations with different orbital heights and different inclinations to get coverage density. The Sub-constallation at each height is called a shell.

The original SpaceX Starlink Generation constellation of over 4,000 satellites (see diagram below) is based on five shells with the following parameter ranges for each shell:

· Orbit Altitude: 540 and 570 Km – each shell has a different altitude

· Orbit Inclination: 53 to 97 degrees – each shell has a different inclination

· Orbital Planes per shell – between 4 and 72 planes per shell

· Satellites Per Plane: 22 to 53 satellites per plane

Starlink Generation 2 constellation will be even more complex. The Starlink satellites have been significantly upgraded to provide increased data throughput and direct to cellphone coverage and services. Over 9,000 of the planned ~12,000 Generation 2 satellites are already in orbit. Gen two constellation will have at least 9 shells over a wider range of inclinations and altitudes. The shells will be massive, with over 3 times the number of satellites per orbital plane, with some shells holding over 5000 satellites

You can read more about the build out of Starlink Gen 1 and Gen 2 constellations HERE

Now that we have a basic understanding of orbital mechanics and how satellite constellations are constructed, we can address sizing for an effective Gome Space-Based missile defense system. We will start by looking at SDI ( Strategic Defense Initiative) Brilliant Pebbles.

The Past as Prolog: 1990s Brilliant Pebbles Architecture

The problem Brilliant Pebbles was trying to solve:

• Boost Phase destruction a USSR/Russian nuclear-armed ICBM attack fired from fixed missile silos or mobile missile launchers in the boost phase, with Midcourse Phase intercept for missiles not destroyed in the boost phase
• Russian ICBM attacks take flight paths over the North Pole. Satellite coverage and concentration over northern latitudes is critical.
• Initial SDI Brilliant Pebble satellite configurations were designed to eliminate a full-scale first strike. AS outlined in the 2000 paper Brilliant Pebbles’ Are Not That Smart, "a fleet [of satellites] would have on the order of 7,000 missiles in orbit, which would keep about 700 over the Soviet Union at any given time. The ratio of the total number of missiles in orbit to those available for action [in range to intercept an ICBM] was known as the absentee ratio."
• Later, SDI scaled back Pebble system requirements to between 1600 to 2000 interceptors in orbit to defeat a limited nuclear exchange from rogue elements in Russia ( at the time of the breakup of the USSR) or North Korea (see summary HERE)
• Interceptors would not operate in the atmosphere or attack aircraft or cruise missiles. There was no requirement for thermal entry shielding
• Despite the primary mission to defeat a Soviet first strike, it was understood that Brilliant Pebbles, based on the physics of orbital mechanics, would provide global coverage. The system would be able to engage secondary submarine follow-up strike launched from any location in the world and could protect all of our Western Allies for any portion of a strike aimed at them …

The GAO (Government Accounting Office) provided an overview and cost/risk analysis of a scaled-back SDI Brilliant Pebbles system.

Reports note that the probability of a successful kill would be about 60% (based on the technological limitations at the time). In fact, the GAO report was a warning to Congress and the Executive Branch that the technology was simply not ready. Today, we would expect a Golden Dome to reflect the intercept ratio we see in earth-based systems - 90% to 95%

The Heritage Foundation held a more positive view of in their position paper, Brilliant Pebbles: The Revolutionary Idea for Strategic Defense ​

In the end, the USSR collapsed, The world wanted a peace dividend, and a limited ground-based Midcourse intercept system was developed, previsouly described Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GBMD)

With this background in mind, let's fast forward to today

Golden Dome – An Assessment of Scope and Size

Today’s Golden Dome has very similar requirements to Brilliant Pebbles DSDI concept. Golden Dome requirements have been expanded to cover threats from North Korea, China, and Russia. Expanded attack profiles for Hypersonic Glide Vehicles, IRBMs (to protect Western Pacific Allies and military bases), and possibly long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles or nuclear-armed bombers.

Golden Dome will be a global defense platform that can protect the US and our Allies. It will even provide protection for Navy Carrier battle groups anywhere on 75% of the Earth covered by water.

The DoD has not released specific system specifications for Golden Dome – but when they are, I’ll devote a Dystopic Newsletter to what unclassified details are released. However, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published an in-depth analysis and simulation that describes the minimum number of interceptors within range of a missile launched from any location on Earth. The simulation is based on a limited set of space-based interceptor constellation parameters to limit simulation complexity:

• Orbit Inclination of the Orbital planes: 30 deg, 45 deg, 60 deg, and 90 deg polar
• Number of interceptors in the constellation: in 5 steps from a total of 98 to 2013
• An interceptor with a maximum kill Radius of 836 Km
• An intercept engagement at an altitude of 200 Km
• Obitual planes with altitudes of 300 Km. So the system in VLEO- Very Low Earth Orbit and atmospheric drag will be an operational issue. Fuel consumption to maintain orbit (station keeping) will be a design issue and the interceptor satellite may require the ability to perform in orbit refueling.

Based on these parameters, the calculation of the number of interceptors within range is performed at each latitude, resulting in bands of the number of satellites “in range”. The following figure illustrates these bands; the darker the band, the more satellites in range of a given location.

I have chosen two constellation configurations that optimise the number of intercepts across the four major countries that are a threat: Russia, China, North Korea, and a nuclear-armed Iran. The results are listed below:

From the simulation, a 90-degree polar orbit and the largest simulated constellation size, 2013 interceptors, provided the best coverage of all advisories. Russia has the best interceptor in range due to its extensive territory. This is deceptive because ICBM fields and mobile launchers are not evenly distributed around Russia or any other country's total land mass. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation based on the percentage of land mass of the Earth multiplied by the constellation's size provides an upper bounding number. For a 2013 satellite constellation, the numbers would be:

• Russia: 3.4% of Earth’s land mass - 68 satellites
• China: 1.8% of Earth's land mass – 36 satellites
• North Korea: 0.025% of Earth's land mass – <1 satellite (note: boost phase track effectively expands the missile targeting area beyond N. Korea borders_
• IRAN: 0.33% of Earth's land mass – 7 satellites
• The oceans: 71% of the Earth’s land mass - 1,429 satellites

A majority of the satellites in the are either over the ocean or over friendly or neutral territory – the absentee ratio discussed previously from Brilliant Pebbles’ Are Not That Smart.

Assume we want the system to intercept at least 100 Russian missiles, then we have two options.

First, add more satellites. A second or third constellation shell, similar to how Starlink constellations are organized, could be added to increase coverage. The build-out can be staged for each constellation shell.

Second, extend the intercept engagement window. If the system were designed to intercept both boost and midcourse phase missiles, that would bring a series of additional intercepts in play, more than tripling the intercept numbers based on the extended midcourse flight duration.

In all likelihood, both options will be needed

To summarize:

Golden Dome will likely require a minimum of 2000 interceptors and is expected to be expanded to 4000 or more to serve as a deterrent. While boost phase intercept is preferred, the engagement should be expanded to the mid-course phase, tripling opportunities for additional interceptors to engage. Taking Russia as an example. The recommendation would expand single mass attack coverage for 36 to 216 missiles in range.

The bottom line - Golden is going to be a big constellation on par with the current Starlink system

… In Breaking News

Ecostar and SpaceX Starlink have just a frequency spectrum deal!

EchoStar has entered into a definitive agreement with SpaceX to sell the company's AWS-4 and H-block spectrum licenses for approximately $17 billion.

The two licensed blocks that SpaceX is buying include the rights to provide ground-based 5G cellphone and broadband service, specifically

• AWS-4 band: 2000–2020 MHz and 2180–2200 MHz.
• H-block: 1995–2000 MHz and 2195–2200 MHz (partial overlay)

SpaceX can use the bandwidth to expand its satellite-cellular offerings to its cellular carrier customers (T-Mobile, AT&T, etc) or possibly make a play for its own cellular service. My money is on SpaceX expanding its business with its existing cellular carrier partners. It's very difficult to build out a cellular operation – been there and done that for 4G LTE.

You can read the press release HERE

Geopolitical Potpourri

Some pithy commentary on world events …

The US Labor Day weekend witnessed two items of note from China ..

The first was in China’s celebration of the 80th anniversary of the end of World War 2 and the defeat of Japan. China’s massive military parade was, by all accounts, impressive. What was not impressive was what China’s President Xi claimed, that China, not the US, played the largest role in defeating Japan.

The Truth is the Chinese Nationalists who reside in Taiwan managed a regular Army and joined with British and US efforts to defeat the Japanese in China and South West Asia. The Chinese Communists barely fought. Instead, they harbored their strength and weapons and attacked the Nationalists, whose army and resources were spent after years of fighting. Mao and the Chinese communists were quite literally carven (i.e. timid and lacking courage), and President Xi’s “histrionics” ring completely false. Find out more HERE

The second event of interest was India’s Narendra Modi traveling to China for the first time in 7 years at the 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. Modi was clearly using the meeting to show his disdain for President Trump’s multiple rounds of economic sanctions by cozying up to both Vladimir Putin and President Xi. This begs the question, by raising tariffs against India, has President Trump inadvertently ruptured US-India relations? Both tht US and India need to carefully work this out. If President Trump is not more careful and measured, he may be remembered as the President that lost India, much like President Truman is remembered as “The President that lost China” after World War 2. Find out more HERE

Meanwhile … The other International issues “smolder” in the background

· Negotiations for a ceasefire or peace in the Ukraine-Russia conflict are at a dead standstill. It’s time for President Trump to follow through with the Russian sanctions and transfer of additional arms to Ukraine. It appears Russia will have to reach 2 million casualties and face a meltdown of its economy for Putin to come to the table.

· In a similar fashion, despite a major defeat in the 12-Day War between Israel and Iran, Iran refuses to enter negotiations with the US and the EU on the elimination of their nuclear weapons program. Fortunately, both the US and EU are ratcheting up sanctions. Will they bring Iran to the table, or will the US and Israel be forced to start a second round of attacks on Iran’s missile and nuclear industries? A more serious question: Where is all of Iran’s highly enriched uranium?

· Israel continues the ‘reduction” of Hamas by invading Gaza City. When will Israel choose to end the hostilities? World opinion, for what it's worth, is waiting heavily against Israel.

The chaos never ends …

That's a wrap for this week ...

Up next - Part 2 of an in-depth look at the Golden Dome Missile Defense program - a focus on Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) and the technology driving it. The US and possibly some of our Allies are about to commit to $500 billion on this program over 10 years - as a tax taxpayer or an ally, it would be good to understand what you are getting!

Dystopic- The Technology Behind Today's News Thank you for your readership and support. Please recommend Dystopic to friends and family who are interested, or just share this email. New Readers can sign up for Dystopic HERE​ If you have missed a Dystopic News letter, you can find select back copies HERE​

How The Hell Did We Get Here? A Citizen's Guide to The New Cold War and Rebuilding of Deterrence

Available on Amazon USA HERE, Amazon Internationally (on your local Amazon page), or through Barnes & Noble and other major retailers online.

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